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1 Introduction9
While rent-seeking contests with continuous and independent type distribu-10
tions are quite interesting, basic issues such as existence and uniqueness of a11
pure-strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE) have been addressed only partially.112
Indeed, previous work on the issue of existence focused either on symmetric13
contests (Fey, 2008; Ryvkin, 2010) or on the case of a continuous technol-14
ogy (Wasser, 2013a, 2013b). Moreover, little general was known about the15
uniqueness of the equilibrium.16
Below, it is shown that in any rent-seeking contest with independent17
and continuous types, there exists a unique PSNE.2 The contest success18
function merely needs to be of the logit form with concave impact functions,19
and players’ private information may relate to either costs or valuations.20
The result holds even when the contest is ex-ante asymmetric,3 so that the21
equilibrium may entail inactive types.4 Moreover, no restriction is imposed on22
the shape of the type distributions. Generally, existence ensures consistency23
of a model, whereas uniqueness strengthens numerical analyses, theoretical24
results, and experimental findings.25
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the26
set-up. Existence is dealt with in Section 3. Section 4 discusses uniqueness.27
A numerical illustration can be found in Section 5. Section 6 concludes. An28
1Generally, in games of incomplete information, the PSNE refers to strategic optimiza-
tion at the ex-ante stage (Athey, 2001). See Section 2 for a formal definition and the
Appendix for further discussion.
2Uniqueness means here that for any given player, any two PSNE strategies differ at
most on a null set. This corresponds to the strongest form of uniqueness for PSNE.
3Ex-ante asymmetry may be reflected, e.g., in heterogeneous distributions of marginal
costs, heterogeneous distributions of valuations, or in heterogeneous economies of scale.
4Wa¨rneryd (2003) explicitly allows for inactive types in a common-value setting.
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Appendix contains technical lemmas.29
2 Set-up30
There are N ≥ 2 players. Each player i = 1, ..., N observes a signal (or31
type) ci, drawn from an interval Di = [ci, ci], where 0 < ci < ci. Signals are32
independent across players. Moreover, player i does not observe the signal33
cj of any other player j 6= i. The distribution function of player i’s signal is34
denoted by Fi = Fi(ci). Each player i chooses a level of activity yi ≥ 0 at35
cost gi(yi). It is assumed that gi(0) = 0, and that gi is twice continuously36
differentiable on R+, with g′i > 0 on R++, and g′′i ≥ 0. Player i’s payoff is37
Πi(yi, y−i, ci) = pi(yi, y−i) − cigi(yi), where pi(yi, y−i) = yi/(yi +
∑
j 6=i yj) if38
yi +
∑
j 6=i yj > 0, and pi(yi, y−i) = 1/N otherwise.
5
39
A strategy for player i is a (measurable) mapping σi : Di → R+. De-40
note by Si the set of strategies for player i. For a profile σ−i = {σj}j 6=i ∈41
S−i =
∏
j 6=i Sj, and a type ci ∈ Di, player i’s interim expected payoff is given42
by Πi(yi, σ−i, ci) =
∫
D−i
Πi(yi, σ−i(c−i), ci)dF−i(c−i), where D−i =
∏
j 6=iDj,43
σ−i(c−i) = {σj(cj)}j 6=i, and dF−i(c−i) =
∏
j 6=i dFj(cj). A Bayesian Nash44
equilibrium (BNE) is a profile σ∗ = {σ∗i }Ni=1 ∈ S =
∏N
i=1 Si such that45
Πi(σ
∗
i (ci), σ
∗
−i, ci) ≥ Πi(yi, σ∗−i, ci) for any i = 1, ..., N , any ci ∈ Di, and46
any yi ≥ 0. A pure-strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE) is a profile σ∗ ∈ S47
such that for any i = 1, ..., N , and for almost any ci ∈ Di, the inequality48
Πi(σ
∗
i (ci), σ
∗
−i, ci) ≥ Πi(yi, σ∗−i, ci) holds for any yi ≥ 0.649
5As usual, a simple change of variables allows to capture other types of contest success
functions and other forms of uncertainty, e.g., about valuations. Cf. Ryvkin (2010).
6As shown in the Appendix, this amounts to the standard definition.
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3 Existence50
This section builds on prior work by Fey (2008), Ryvkin (2010), and Wasser51
(2013a). Existence is shown first for the ε-constrained contest, for ε > 0, in52
which each player i = 1, ..., N may use only strategies with values in [ε,∞).53
Lemma 3.1 There is a level of activity E > 0 such that, for any suffi-54
ciently small ε > 0, there exists a BNE σε in the ε-constrained contest such55
that each player i’s strategy σεi is continuous, monotone, and bounded by E.56
Proof. Since costs are strictly increasing and convex, there is an E >57
0 such that any yi > E is suboptimal. Moreover, Πi exhibits decreasing58
differences in yi and ci. Hence, existence of a monotone PSNE σ˜
ε in the ε-59
constrained contest follows from Athey (2001, Cor. 2.1). Note now that type60
ci’s ε-constrained problem, maxyi≥ε Πi(yi, σ˜
ε
−i, ci), has a unique solution yi =61
σεi (ci). Indeed, if σ˜
ε
−i(c−i) 6= 0 with positive probability, then Πi(·, σ˜ε−i, ci)62
is strictly concave on [ε, E], while otherwise, the unique solution is yi = ε.63
Hence, σεi (ci) = σ˜
ε
i (ci) with probability one, for any i = 1, ..., N . This implies64
that σεi (ci) is also type ci’s best response to σ
ε
−i, for any i = 1, ..., N , and65
any ci ∈ Di. Thus, σε = (σε1, ..., σεN) is a BNE in the ε-constrained contest.66
Clearly, each σεi is monotone. Finally, continuity of σ
ε
i follows from Berge’s67
Theorem, as Πi(·, σε−i, ·) is continuous on the compact set [ε, E]×Di. 68
Consider now a sequence {εm}∞m=1 such that εm ↘ 0, and select a BNE σm69
in the εm-constrained contest for each m ∈ N, with the properties specified70
in the previous lemma.71
Lemma 3.2 The sequence {σm}∞m=1 has a uniformly converging subse-72
3
quence.73
Proof. In view of Lemma 3.1 and the Theorem of Arzela`-Ascoli, it suffices74
to find a λ > 0 such that σmi has everywhere a slope exceeding −λ for any75
m ∈ N and any i. In terms of the transformed choice variable yλi = yi + λci,76
a type ci’s expected payoff in σ
m may be written as77
Π
λ
i (y
λ
i , σ
m
−i, ci) =
∫
D−i
(yλi − λci)dF−i(c−i)
yλi − λci +
∑
j 6=i σ
m
j (cj)
− cigi(yλi − λci), (1)78
provided that yλi − λci = yi > 0. Hence, for λ sufficiently large, the cross-79
partial80
∂2Π
λ
i
∂yλi ∂ci
=
∫
D−i
2λ
∑
j 6=i σ
m
j (cj)dF−i(c−i)(
yi +
∑
j 6=i σ
m
j (cj)
)3 − g′i(yi) + ciλg′′i (yi)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
(2)81
≥ 2λ
NE
∫
D−i
∑
j 6=i σ
m
j (cj)dF−i(c−i)(
yi +
∑
j 6=i σ
m
j (cj)
)2 − g′i(yi) (3)82
≥
(
2λci
NE
− 1
)
g′i(yi) (4)83
is seen to be positive in the range of ci where yi = σ
m
i (ci) > 0. Thus, for λ84
large, yλi is weakly increasing in ci, which proves the claim. 85
By Lemma 3.2, one may assume that {σm}∞m=1 converges uniformly to86
some σ∗ ∈ S. Next, it is shown that in σ∗, at least one player is active with87
probability one.88
Lemma 3.3 There is some player i such that σ∗i (ci) > 0 with probability89
one.90
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Proof. Suppose that for each i, there is a set Di ⊆ Di of positive measure91
such that σ∗i (ci) = 0 for all ci ∈ Di. Then, by uniform convergence, there92
exists, for any ε > 0, an m0 = m0(ε) such that σ
m
i (ci) < ε for any i, any93
ci ∈ Di, and any m ≥ m0. But, from the Kuhn-Tucker condition for type ci94
in the εm-constrained contest,95
0 ≥
∫
D−i
∑
j 6=i σ
m
j (cj)dF−i(c−i)(
σmi (ci) +
∑
j 6=i σ
m
j (cj)
)2 − cig′i(E), (5)96
where D−i =
∏
j 6=iDj. Integrating over Di, and subsequently summing over97
i = 1, ..., N , one obtains98
0 ≥
∫
D
(N − 1)dF (c)∑N
i=1 σ
m
i (ci)
−
N∑
i=1
g′i(E)
∫
Di
cidFi(ci), (6)99
where D = ∏Ni=1Di and dF (c) = ∏Ni=1 dFi(ci). For ε small, however, this is100
impossible. 101
The following is the first main result of this paper.102
Theorem 3.4 In the unconstrained contest, σ∗ is a PSNE in continuous103
and monotone strategies.104
Proof. Fix a player i ∈ {1, ..., N}. For any m ∈ N, since σm is a105
BNE in the εm-constrained contest, Πi(σ
m
i (ci), σ
m
−i, ci) ≥ Πi(yi, σm−i, ci) for106
any ci ∈ Di and any yi ≥ εm. Therefore, if the event σ∗−i(c−i) = 0 is null,107
letting m → ∞ implies Πi(σ∗i (ci), σ∗−i, ci) ≥ Πi(yi, σ∗−i, ci) for any ci ∈ Di108
and any yi > 0. Suppose next that σ
∗
−i(c−i) = 0 with positive probability.109
Then, by Lemma 3.3, σ∗i (ci) > 0 with probability one. Let ci ∈ Di with110
5
σ∗i (ci) > 0. If yi > 0, then the argument proceeds as above. To complete111
the proof, note that Πi(·, σ∗−i, ci) is l.s.c., so that yi = 0 cannot be the only112
profitable deviation for ci. 113
4 Uniqueness114
Consider two PSNE σ∗ and σ∗∗ such that, for some player i, the event σ∗i (ci) 6=115
σ∗∗i (ci) has positive probability. Then, as noted below, σ
∗ and σ∗∗ must differ116
in an essential way for at least two players.117
Lemma 4.1 There are players i 6= j such that each of the independent118
events σ∗i (ci) 6= σ∗∗i (ci) and σ∗j(cj) 6= σ∗∗j (cj) has positive probability.119
Proof. Suppose there is some i such that σ∗−i(c−i) = σ
∗∗
−i(c−i) with120
probability one. Then, Πi(·, σ∗−i, ci) = Πi(·, σ∗∗−i, ci) for any ci ∈ Di. Thus,121
σ∗i (ci) = σ
∗∗
i (ci) with probability one, which is a contradiction. 122
The following is the second main result of this paper.123
Theorem 4.2 The PSNE in the unconstrained contest is unique.124
Proof. Following Rosen (1965), write σ∗,s = (1−s)σ∗+sσ∗∗ for 0 ≤ s ≤ 1,125
and consider126
Φs =
N∑
i=1
∫
Di
pii(σ
∗,s, ci) (σ∗∗i (ci)− σ∗i (ci)) dFi(ci) (7)127
for s = 0, 1, where pii(σ, ci) = ∂Πi(σi(ci), σ−i, ci)/∂yi denotes type ci’s marginal128
expected payoff at a profile σ ∈ S.7 From the Kuhn-Tucker conditions,129
7It is shown in the Appendix that Φ0 and Φ1 are well-defined.
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pii(σ
∗, ci) ≤ 0 for almost any ci ∈ Di; moreover, σ∗i (ci) = 0 if pii(σ∗, ci) < 0.130
It follows that Φ0 ≤ 0, and similarly, Φ1 ≥ 0. To provoke a contradic-131
tion, it will be shown now that Φ1 − Φ0 < 0. Denote by pii(σ, ci, c−i) =132
∂Πi(σi(ci), σ−i(c−i), ci)/∂yi type ci’s marginal ex-post payoff at σ ∈ S, when133
facing c−i ∈ D−i. Then, by Lemma A.2 in the Appendix,134
Φ1 − Φ0 =
∫
D
N∑
i=1
(pii(σ
∗∗, ci, c−i)− pii(σ∗, ci, c−i))zi(ci)dF (c) (8)135
=
∫
D
N∑
i=1
{∫ 1
0
∂pii(σ
∗,s, ci, c−i)
∂s
zi(ci)ds
}
dF (c), (9)136
where zi(ci) = σ
∗∗
i (ci)− σ∗i (ci). An application of the chain rule delivers137
∂pii(σ
∗,s, ci, c−i)
∂s
=
N∑
j=1
∂2pi(σ
∗,s
i (ci), σ
∗,s
−i (c−i))
∂yi∂yj
zj(cj)− ci g′′i (σ∗,si (ci))︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
zi(ci),
(10)138
for any i, any ci ∈ Di, and any c−i ∈ D−i. It follows that139
Φ1 − Φ0 ≤
∫
D
(∫ 1
0
(
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
∂2pi(σ
∗,s
i (ci), σ
∗,s
−i (c−i))
∂yi∂yj
zi(ci)zj(cj)
)
ds
)
dF (c).
(11)140
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One can verify, however, that141
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
∂2pi(yi, y−i)
∂yi∂yj
zizj (12)142
= −
N∑
i=1
2Y−i
Y 3
z2i +
N∑
i=1
∑
j 6=i
Y − 2Y−i
Y 3
zizj (13)143
= − 2
Y 3
N∑
i=1
Y−iz2i −
2
Y 3
N∑
i=1
∑
j>i
∑
k 6=i,j
ykzizj (14)144
= − 1
Y 3
N∑
i=1
Y−iz2i −
1
Y 3
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
∑
k 6=i,j
ykzizj (15)145
= − 1
Y 3
N∑
i=1
(z2i Y−i + yiZ
2
−i) ≤ 0 (16)146
for any (y1, ..., yN) ∈ RN+\{0} and any (z1, ..., zN) ∈ RN , where Y =
∑N
i=1 yi,147
Y−i =
∑
j 6=i yj, and Z−i =
∑
j 6=i zj. Moreover, z
2
i Y−i = zi(ci)
2
∑
j 6=i σ
∗,s
j (cj) is148
positive for any s ∈ (0, 1) if σ∗i (ci) 6= σ∗∗i (ci) and σ∗j(cj) 6= σ∗∗j (cj) for some149
j 6= i. Thus, by Lemma 4.1, Φ1 − Φ0 < 0. 150
5 Numerical illustration151
Figure 1 shows PSNE strategies in a two-player lottery contest, where types152
are distributed uniformly on D1 = [0.01, 1.01] and D2 = [0.51, 5.51], respec-153
tively. Note that player 2 remains inactive for c2 > c
∗
2 ≈ 4.21.154
—place Figure 1 here—155
Caption:“Figure 1: An equilibrium involving inactive types”156
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6 Concluding remarks157
While this paper has focused on the existence and uniqueness of a PSNE in158
asymmetric rent-seeking contests, it follows from the proofs that also any of159
the BNE studied by Fey (2008) and Ryvkin (2010) is unique.160
7 Appendix: Technical lemmas161
Lemma A.1 A profile σ∗ ∈ S is a PSNE in the unconstrained contest if and162
only if
∫
D
Πi(σ
∗
i (ci), σ
∗
−i(c−i), ci)dF (c) ≥
∫
D
Πi(σ̂i(ci), σ
∗
−i(c−i), ci)dF (c) for163
any i = 1, ..., N , and any σ̂i ∈ Si.164
Proof. Let σ∗ be a PSNE, and consider a deviation σ̂i ∈ Si for some165
player i. Then, Πi(σ
∗
i (ci), σ
∗
−i, yi) ≥ Πi(σ̂i(ci), σ∗−i, ci) for almost any ci ∈ Di.166
Integrating over Di, the assertion follows via Fubini’s theorem. Conversely,167
suppose that σ∗ is not a PSNE. Then, there is a player i and a set Di ⊆ Di168
of positive measure such that σ∗i (ci) is not a best response to σ
∗
−i for ci, for169
any ci ∈ Di. Define σ̂i(ci) as ci’s best response to σ∗−i if it exists; otherwise170
as σ∗i (ci)/2 if σ
∗
i (ci) > 0, and as pr{σ∗−i(c−i) = 0}/(2cig′i(E)) if σ∗i (ci) = 0.171
Then σ̂i is a profitable deviation. 172
Lemma A.2 Let σ∗ ∈ S be a PSNE in the unconstrained contest. Then,173
for almost any ci ∈ Di, the function pii(σ∗, ci, ·) is integrable, with pii(σ∗, ci) =174 ∫
D−i
pii(σ
∗, ci, c−i)dF−i(c−i). Moreover, pii(σ∗, ·) is integrable.175
Proof. The first claim is obvious if σ∗i (ci) > 0 for almost any ci ∈ Di.176
Suppose that σ∗i (ci) = 0 with positive probability. Then, by Lemma 3.3, the177
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event σ∗−i(c−i) = 0 is null. Take some c−i ∈ D−i with σ∗−i(c−i) 6= 0. Then,178
for any ci ∈ Di, by concavity, the difference quotient Πi(yi, σ∗−i(c−i), ci)/yi179
is monotone increasing as yi ↘ 0, with limit pii(σ∗, ci, c−i). Since also180
Πi(yi, σ
∗
−i(c−i), ci)/yi ≥ −cig′i(E), the first claim follows from Levi’s theorem.181
The second claim follows from Lebesgue’s theorem, because pii(σ
∗, ·) ≤ 0 from182
the Kuhn-Tucker conditions, and because pii(σ
∗, ·) ≥ −cig′i(E), as above. 183
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